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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Zane Parmer appeals from his conviction for lewd conduct with a
child.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedincls
Parmer, a massage therapist, sexually abused a fourteen-year-old girl by
touching her clitoris with a vibrating massager and putting his fingers in her
vagina in the course of a therapeutic massage. (Tr., vol. II, p. 960, L. 15 - p.
1000, L. 11.) A grand jury indicted Parmer for lewd conduct with a child. (R., vol.
I, pp. 8-9.)
The state provided notice of intent to admit evidence governed by I.R.E.
404(b), and moved in limine for a ruling on its admissibility. (Notice of intent to
use 404(b) Evidence (hereinafter "First Notice"); State's Motion in Limine;

znd

Motion in Limine; 2"' Notice of Intent to use 404(b) Evidence (hereinafter
"Second Notice"); State's Brief in Support of 2"d Motion in ~imine.') The
evidence related primarily to other women and girls whom Parmer sexually
touched in the course of physical therapy or massage. (First Notice; Second
Notice; Tr., vol. I, p. 6, L. 9 - p. 10, L. 8; p. 17, L. 3 - p. 22, L. 25; 08/02/06 Tr., p.
13, L. 10 - p. 15, L. 7; p. 19, L. 16 - p. 23, L. 2.) Parmer argued, through

' These motions, notices and brief were filed under seal and are. included in the
record as exhibits filed under seal. The first motion in limine was filed before the
first jury trial, and the second motion in limine was filed after the first jury trial but
before the second jury trial. They are referred to here together for convenience
only.

counsel, that the events that the witnesses in question would testify to were
either too factually dissimilar (generally arguing there was insufficient evidence of
sexual intent in the other touchings or that the sexual contact was consensual
among adults) or too remote in time to be properly admissible. (Tr., vol. I, p. 10,
L. 11 -p. 16, L.25;08/02/06Tr.,p.I6,L. 11 -p. 19, L. 13; p.23, L.7-p.24,L.
7.) Ruling on the motions in limine, the trial court excluded evidence of sexual
conduct or contact outside the context of Parmer providing physical therapy or
massage to the witnesses, but admitted evidence of sexual touching by Parmer
while providing physical therapy or massage services to female patients. (Tr.,
vol. I, p. 23, L. 1 - p. 26, L. 13; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 24, L. 8 - p. 29, L. 5.)
The case proceeded to trial.

(R., vol. I, pp. 119-45.) The witnesses

covered by the first in limine ruling testified. (Tr., vol. I, p. 233, L. 10 - p. 245, L.

19;p.249,L.Il-p.255,L.21~p.261,L.13-p.273,L.25~p.279,L.14-p.
293,L.2;p.301,L.16-p.315,L.10;p.329,L.21

-p.337, L. 16.) Thetrial

ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. (R., vol. I,
pp. 141-45.)
The case proceeded to retrial. (R., vol. II, pp. 247-77.) The witnesses
allowed to testify under the trial court's I.R.E. 404(b) rulings testified. (Tr., vol. 11,
p. 1063, L.23-p. 1085, L. 1 6 ; ~ 1129,
.
L. 15-p. 1137, L.2;p. 1144, L.20-p.
1163, L. 3; p. 1173, L. 8 - p . 1206, L. 14; p. 1226, L. 17-p. 1238, L. 16; p. 1245,
L. 13-p. 1259, L.2; p. 1266,L. 16-p. 1275,L. 15;p. 1285, L. 13-p. 1300,L.
25.) This time the jury unanimously found Parmer guilty. (R., vol. 11, p. 271.)

The district court sentenced Parmer to 20 years incarceration with seven
years determinate.

(R., vol. II, pp. 281-84.) Parmer filed a timely notice of

appeal. (R., vol. 11, pp. 285-89.)

ISSUES
Parmer states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court commit reversible error by allowing
A.
eight prior bad act witnesses to testify in the state's case-in-chief?

B.
Was it reversible error to preclude the defense from eliciting
testimony regarding Officer Gilbert's interview with Mr. Parmer?
(Appellant's brief, p. 20 (emphasis and underlining omitted, capitalization
altered).)
The state rephrases the issue as:
I. The district court held that evidence that Parmer had sexually touched
other women while performing physical therapy or massage, the same
circumstances under which he touched the victim in this case, was admissible.
Has Parmer failed to show that the district court erred in admitting this evidence?
Has Parmer failed to show from the record that he preserved any issue
2.
related to I.R.E. 106?

ARGUMENT
I.
Parmer Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Rulinq Admittina I.R.E.
404(bl Evidence

A.

Introduction
The district court, ruling in ljmjne, admitted evidence by several witnesses

that they had been sexually touched by Parmer during the course of physical
therapy massages; circumstances very similar to those presented in the victim's
testimony. (Tr., vol. I, p. 23, L. 1 - p. 26, L. 13; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 24, L. 8 - p. 29,
L. 5.) On appeal Parmer argues the trial court erred, claiming the evidence was
inadmissible (Appellant's brief, pp. 30-37), and that the court erred by making its
ruling on the basis of the state's offer of proof (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-30).~
Parmer's arguments, however, lack legal and logical merit, much less show an
abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are generally reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Porter, 130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997); State
v. Lewis, 126 ldaho 77, 82, 878 P.2d 776, 781 (1994). Rulings under I.R.E.
404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is
admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given free review while the

Parrner also apparently argues that one of the witnesses should have been
excluded for violation of an order excluding witnesses, but has failed to show that
the witness actually violated any such order; that the defense moved for her
exclusion on this basis; that the defense obtained any adverse ruling to challenge
on appeal, or that there was any abuse of discretion in not excluding the witness
for any alleged violation of any order. (Appellant's brief, pp. 37-40.)

determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Sheldon, 145 ldaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008).
C.

The Evidence In Question Was Properlv Admitted BVThe Court
Rule 404(b) of the ldaho Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of

other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" is generally inadmissible to prove the character of
a person or that the person acted in conformity with that character. I.R.E. 404(b).
Such evidence is admissible, however, to prove matters other than propensity.
I.R.E. 404(b). The district court must therefore first determine whether the
evidence is probative to matters other than propensity. Second, the district court
must weigh the probative value as to matters other than propensity against the
danger of unfair prejudice, i.e., the likelihood that the trier of fact would consider
the evidence as going to character or propensity. State v. Cross, 132 ldaho 667,
670,978 P.2d 227,230 (1999). Evidence is excludable under the second prong
of this test only if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65
(2003).
The district court ruled that evidence showing that during the course of
therapeutic massages Parmer touched several females in a sexual manner was
admissible. (Tr., VOI.II, p. 1063, L. 23 - p. 1085, L. 16 (witness K.M., Parmer put
fingers in her vagina then rubbed himself against her until he ejaculated); p.
1129, L. 15 - p. 1137, L. 2 (witness C.P., Parmer touched her buttocks); p. 1444,
L. 20 - p. 1163, L. 3 (witness G.C., Parmer touched her sides, trying to fondle

her breasts); p. 1173, L. 8 - p. 1206, L. 14 (witness T.C., Parmer touched her
chest and genital area, rubbed his crotch on her buttocks, performed oral sex on
her); p. 1226, L. 17 - p. 1238, L. 16 (witness C.

H.,Parmer touched her breast

with his mouth and inserted his finger in her vagina); p. 1245, L. 13 - p. 1259, L.
2 (witness P.F., Parmer touched her chest and genital area, performed oral sex
on her and put his fingers in her vagina); p. 1266, L. 16 - p. 1275, L. 15 (witness
J.H., Parmer touched buttocks and between breasts); p. 1285, L. 13 - p. 1300, L.

25 (witness 6.0.' Parmer repeatedly touched her vaginal area).) This evidence
was relevant to prove common scheme or plan, motive, opportunity, sexual
intent, and absence of mistake or accident. (Tr., vol. I, p. 23, Ls. 1-8; p. 24, L. 25

- p. 25, L. 18; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 27, L. 11 - p. 28, L. 4.)

The court concluded that

any prejudicial potential of the evidence could be minimized with an instruction
on the proper consideration of the evidence, and therefore was admissible. (Tr.,
vol. I,p. 25, L. 19-p. 26, L. 10; 08/02/06Tr., p.27, Ls. 11-20.)
In addition to the relevance found by the district court, the evidence was
also relevant as corroboration of the victim. State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 74546,819 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1991) (prior bad act evidence may be properly used
to corroborate victim). A jury could conceivably find a child's testimony that she
was brazenly sexually abused in a semi-public place to be unlikely absent
corroboration. Evidence that Parmer had done very similar things under very
similar circumstances made the victim's factual testimony more credible.
Parmer argues that there were dissimilarities between the victim's
testimony and the testimony of the 404(b) witnesses that make the latter

irrelevant. Specifically, he asserts that three of the witnesses testified that at
some point they engaged in consensual contact with Parmer, that several of the
witnesses were older when they were touched, and that some of the 404(b)
witnesses discussed touching of different body parts. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3234.3) These arguments are without merit.
First, even though there was some consensual contact by some of the
witnesses, all of them stated that the sexual touching was initiated by Parmer
during the course of a massage. Second, the age differences that existed with
some of the witnesses did not make the evidence irrelevant.

See State v.

Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 220, 970 P.2d 10, 13 (1998). Finally, even if some of the
touching was different in its details (what part of the woman Parmer touched), the
underlying relevance is that Parmer was touching his massage clients in sexual
ways with sexual intent.

at 219-20, 970 P.2d at 12-13. Parmer's arguments

that the evidence was irrelevant for any purpose but to show propensity are
without merit.
Parmer next argues the court abused its discretion in weighing the
potential prejudice against the probative value. (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-37.)
His argument fails, however, because Parmer's intent was an important part of
this case. Given the circumstances of this case, including that the victim is

Parmer also argues that intent and absence of mistake or accident were not
"disputed issues" until he took the stand and affirmatively denied sexual intent.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35.) This argument is baseless because the state had
the burden of proving sexual intent (which would include disproving accident or
mistake) as an element of the crime. I.C. § 18-1508 (sexual intent an element of
lewd conduct with a child).

young and that touching without sexual intent would be normal in a massage, it
was very important for the state to disprove accidental touching; demonstrate
touching with sexual intent; show that despite the semi-public nature of the place
Parmer had opportunity; show a common scheme or plan; and corroborate the
victim. The court's conclusion that, if the potential prejudice is minimized by a
curative instruction, the potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh the
probative value was well within its discretion.
Parmer has failed to show error in the admission of evidence under I.R.E.
404(b). The evidence was relevant to prove several things other than propensity
and the district court properly exercised its discretion in weighing the potential
prejudice against the probative value.
D.

Parmer's Claim That The District Court Erred By Acceptina An Offer Of
Proof Is Not Preserved For Review
Parmer argues that the district court erred by ruling in limine that the

proffered evidence was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) because the court did not
have the actual evidence before it and based its ruling on the state's offer of
proof.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 20-29.)

This argument fails for the following

reasons: (1) It was not preserved by timely objection, I.R.E. 103(a)(l); State v.

t-JcJe, 127 ldaho 140, 898 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1995); (2) it is unsupported by any
actual legal authority, State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998);
and (3) it is wrong as a matter of law, State v. Joslin, 145 ldaho 75, 82, 175 P.3d

764, 771 (2007) ("The purpose of an offer of proof is to make a record either for
appeal or to enable the court to rule on the admissibility of proffered evidence.").
11.
Parmer's Araument That His Interview With Detective Gilbert And The Confront
Call With The Victim Were Functionallv Part Of The Same Written Or Recorded
Statement Is Without Merit
The district court precluded Parmer from introducing evidence of his own
statements to Detective Gilbert during a police interview because such
statements are hearsay and not subject to any exception. On appeal Parmer
argues that his statements to Detective Gilbert and his statements to the victim
(in the confrontation phone call) are essentially part of the same written or
recorded statement, so that admission of the former was necessary to show the
context of the latter. (Appellant's brief, pp. 43-47.) This argument fails for two
reasons.
First, this issue is not preserved for appellate review because Parmer
never asserted in the district court that the state had to introduce the recording of
the police interview when it introduced the recording of the confrontation call
under I.R.E. 106.

Instead, the record shows that Parmer tried to introduce

evidence of the interview, but that the court excluded it on hearsay grounds. (Tr.,
vol. I, p. 386, L. 9 - p. 389, L. I;p. 450, L. 14 - p. 451, L. 9; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 38,
Ls. 3-7.)

A timely objection is necessary to preserve evidentiary issues for

appeal. I.R.E. 103(a)(l); State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140, 898 P.2d 71 (Ct. App.
1995). Here Parmer has utterly failed to show that he ever requested the trial
court to consider whether evidence of his subsequent statements to Detective

Gilbert were necessary to provide context to his prior statements in the
confrontation call under I.R.E. 106.
Second, the argument that the state is automatically required to admit a
defendant's later explanation of a previously recorded statement by him is
without merit.

Although I.R.E. 106 does provide that if a party presents a

recorded statement that another recorded statement may be admitted "which
ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it," Parmer's
subsequent attempt to explain away, during a police interview, his statements
made in the confrontation call do not fall within the scope of this rule. If Parmer's
argument were accepted, all recorded out of court statements explaining prior
recorded out of court statements would be admissible.

The statements to

Detective Gilbert, in short, were not necessary to frame Parmer's statements to
the victim in proper context in the interest of completeness. See Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 (1988) (Rule 106 applies when
"misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through" the presentation of
additional evidence required for "completeness" (quotes omitted)).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Parmer's conviction for
lewd conduct with a child.
DATED this 1st day of October
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